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Abstract—This paper addresses the problem of interaction between short run and long run 
locational signals and the coordination between generation investments and lumpy transmission 
investments. The short run locational signals we evaluate are sent by nodal pricing and the long run 
ones are sent by the average participation use-of-the-network tariff. Their joint implementation is 
also deemed. Numerical simulations are performed on a two-node network evolving during twenty 
years with increasing demand. The efficiency of these locational signals to coordinate the location of 
generation with lumpy transmission investments is measured. An independent Transmission System 
Operator invests to minimize the total cost of the network, that is to say the sum of the cost of 
congestion with the cost of transmission investments. And a unique generator behaving competitively 
chooses the location of her investments depending on two elements: the locational difference in 
generation investment costs and the costs of the network she may pay with short run nodal prices and 
with the long run average participation tariff. The network tariff varies with the transmission 
investments. And the transmission capacity greatly influences nodal prices. We find out that neither 
short run nodal prices nor long run average participation tariffs can thoroughly coordinate efficiently 
generation and transmission investments because of the lumpiness of transmission line capacities.  
 
Index Terms—generation investment, lumpy transmission investment, long run coordination, 
locational signals, efficiency evaluation 
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1 Introduction 
O ensure a non-discriminatory third party access to the network, the competitive reforms of the 
power sector have required to unbundle the network infrastructures from the competitive 
activities such that generation (FERC, 2006; European Commission, 2007; Pollitt, 2007). In this 
context, a monopoly called Transmission System Operator (TSO) manages the transmission 
network. The TSO and the generators invest then depending on their own objective function. The 
generators maximize profit. The TSO maximizes the social welfare if she is perfectly regulated. 
Despite network unbundling, the location of new generators remains highly dependent on 
transmission investments and vice versa. In this context, pricing schemes must be implemented to 
coordinate generation and transmission investments.  
One could think of relying on the well-known marginal pricing to expand both generation and 
transmission capacity (Crew et al., 1995; Stoft, 2006). One invests so as to equalize short run and 
long run marginal costs of both generation and transmission. If these convenient assumptions 
prevailed in the power system, the generator would invest so as to equalize the marginal generation 
capacity cost with marginal generation cost. And the TSO would do the same equalizing the 
marginal transmission capacity cost with marginal congestion cost. Nodal pricing as market-based 
pricing of transmission service could then govern transmission investment and the location of 
generation (Hogan, 1992; Bushnell-Stoft, 1996, 1997; Chao-Peck 1996).  
Applying this principle to the coordination of generation and transmission investments is not 
possible. The transmission of electricity suffers from many undesirable economic properties that 
make the direct application of these principles impossible. It combines both economies of scale and 
especially lumpiness of capacity (Brunekreeft, 2004). Joskow and Tirole (2005) show that 
lumpiness combined with the short run locational signals from nodal pricing result in an 
underincentive for a merchant investor to reinforce the network. Even if the transmission investment 
is optimal, nodal pricing can lead to inefficient location of generation because of the economic 
properties of the transmission of electricity (Stoft, 2006). Besides, some other less efficient options 
to operate the system are often implemented, although they send less short run locational signals 
(Green, 2004). In brief, not only system operation may not send short run locational signals but also 
these signals are not sufficient to coordinate the location of generation with lumpy transmission 
investments.  
The usual way to comply with these difficulties is to implement a two-part tariff. The first part 
of this tariff should be nodal prices. The second part is network tariffs. These later aim at sharing 
the cost of transmission infrastructures among the network users, especially the generators, in the 
most cost-reflective way. Well-designed network tariffs incentivise the generators to locate 
efficiently on the network and thus to maximize social welfare (Pérez Arriaga-Smeers, 2003). But 
network tariffs are hard to design. A lot of different network tariffs have then been proposed 
(Olmos, 2006). But there may be no network tariffs that achieve the same coordination between 
generation and transmission investment as a vertically integrated utility does.  
This paper only focuses on the average participation tariff for the three following reasons. First 
it has been extensively studied from a static point of view (Kirschen et al.; 1996, Bialek, 1997; 
Rubio-Pérez Arriaga, 2000) and we are going to study it in the dynamic interaction of generation 
and transmission investments. Second the average participation tariff has an interesting property. It 
coincides with the Shapley values. This guarantees that the average participation tariff is a fair, 
symmetric, stable and acceptable allocation of cost for all the “players” (Bialek-Kattuman; 2004). 
T 
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Third network tariffs can send long run locational signals that should overcome the difficulty to 
incentivise the location of generation when transmission investment is lumpy. But the efficiency of 
the average participation tariff for coordinating generation and transmission investments has never 
been studied whether it is implemented with or without short run locational signals (Olmos, 2006; 
Stoft, 2006).  
This paper investigates the efficiency of the average participation tariff to coordinate 
transmission and generation investments whether it is implemented with or without nodal pricing. 
The model used in this paper is similar to the model of Sauma-Oren (2006a, b) but they differ on 
some points. Sauma and Oren do not consider network tariffs and nodal pricing is the unique 
locational signals that they study. The simulations of Sauma and Oren take into account lumpiness 
of transmission investment while their model does not. Sauma and Oren consider uncertainty and 
imperfect competition of generation. They consider that the TSO acts under the constraints of 
generation investments and their optimization problem is an Equilibrium Problem with Equilibrium 
Constraints (EPEC).  
Our paper considers network tariffs and studies their efficiency to locate generation 
investments. The model used to carry out this study includes lumpiness of transmission investments. 
These two points make the optimization problem non-convex and hard to solve. The following 
simplifications are then made. There is no uncertainty. The TSO and the generators have perfect 
information on investments, capacities and value of short run and long run locational signals. The 
TSO is perfectly regulated. The generators behave competitively. This paper does not assume the 
TSO acts under the constraints of the generation investments because the transmission investments 
may face local opposition and not be built. The generators may then locate their plants under the 
constraints of impossible transmission investments. The coordination problem studied in this paper 
is not an EPEC. It is a double optimization one, to maximize the generation profit and to minimize 
the cost of the network.  
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 presents the options of locational signals 
that will be studied in the following sections, that is to say, for the short run locational signals 1° 
nodal pricing and 2° redispatch (that sends no locational signal), and for the long run ones, 1° the 
average participation tariff or 2° no tariff. Section 3 models a liberalised system where a TSO and a 
generator must coordinate to minimize their own costs. The TSO invests to minimize the sum of the 
congestion cost and of the cost of the network investments. The generator minimizes the sum of 
investment costs, operation costs taking into account or not the network congestions and the tariff 
she may have to support. To evaluate the efficiency of coordination achieved by these options and 
their combination, the investments made by a benevolent integrated utility define a benchmark. 
Section 4 analyzes the results of simulations. And section 5 concludes on the limited efficiency of 
short and long run locational signals to coordinate generation and transmission investment.  
 
2 Locational signals between transmission and generation investments in a liberalised 
power market 
In the liberalised system, generation and transmission need signals to coordinate the location 
and timing of their investments. The system operation and the network tariffs can send such 
locational signals. Some options to operate the power system signal congestion. Similarly, some 
options of network tariffs are designed for the generators to take into account the cost of the 
network and the reinforcements that may result from their investment decisions. But other options 
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of network tariffs or system operation do not send any locational signals and are nevertheless 
implemented. This section presents what seems to us, the most and the least efficient options of 
short and long run locational signals and their theoretical effects on coordination between 
generation and transmission investments.  
2.1 Short run system operation and coordination of investments 
Different options to operate the power system are possible. The most efficient option is nodal 
pricing. This option gives a different price to power depending on the network congestion and on 
the node where power is generated or consumed (Schweppe et al., 1988). The nodal price is the 
local economic value of power and includes the generation cost and the congestion cost. Recurring 
differences in nodal prices reveal the structural network congestions. Nodal pricing incentivises the 
generators to use efficiently the available transmission capacities. Thus nodal prices are short run 
locational signals and participate in coordinating generation and transmission investments.  
But nodal pricing or even its zonal version is not always implemented. Although redispatch is 
the least efficient option to operate the system, the TSO may have to implement it (Green 1997a, 
Bompard et al. 2003). In this case, after the energy market closed, the TSO modifies the generation 
scheduling to manage congestion. The congestion cost following the change in generation 
scheduling is then generally socialised. In this means of managing network congestion, the 
electricity market receives no locational signal containing information on the constraints on the grid, 
and the market for power continues to operate as if there were no constraints on it. The generators 
do not take into account the network constraints in the location of their new plants.  
Besides, short run locational signals alone cannot coordinate efficiently generation and 
transmission investments. Owing the volatility of nodal prices, one usually relies on transmission 
rights to distinguish a long run locational signal among the short run ones. The most used ones are 
the Financial Transmission Rights (FTRs). The FTRs send distorted locational signals for three 
reasons. First the market participants do not correctly anticipate the economic value of FTRs and 
add them an excessive risk premium (Siddiqui et al., 2005). Second the FTRs are allocated 
assuming the system operation is simpler than in reality (O’Neill et al., 2006). These simplifications 
also distort the locational signals of FTRs (Lesieutre-Hiskens, 2005; Joskow-Tirole, 2005). Third 
lumpiness of transmission reinforcements depreciates the short locational signals from nodal pricing 
(Stoft, 2006). Long run locational signals must then complete the short run ones to overcome these 
three difficulties.  
2.2 Long run network tariffs and coordination of investments 
Different designs of network tariffs are possible. The simplest option of network tariff is called 
generation-spur only (CER, 2004). The generators are then required to pay only for the line that 
connects them to the network and not for any other lines of the network. This method has a weak 
theoretical efficiency. It only incentivises the generators to be close to the network. An efficient 
network tariff would incentivise the generator to locate plants while taking into account the 
available transmission capacity and the transmission upgrading that may be needed to accommodate 
them. However, at least half of the European TSOs apply generation-spur only (ETSO, 2007).  
The TSO can also implement network tariffs that vary between locations. These locational 
differences of tariff incentivise the generators to connect in areas where it does not create too much 
congestion or in areas where it relieves congestion (Pérez Arriaga – Smeers, 2003). This paper 
studies such a network tariff called the average participation tariff. The average participation tariff 
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allocates the cost of the network depending on the total use of the network by each generator. To 
calculate the network used by each generator, the power flows are traced from generation to load to 
identify the lines and the share of their capacity used by each generator to supply load. The tracing 
rule used to calculate the average participation tariff links the inflows and the outflows in each node 
such that the inflows equally distribute in the outflows as illustrated by fig. 1 (Bialek, 1997).  
 
Fig. 1. Sharing principle. 
 
The flow through the node i is 100 MW. 40% come from line j-i and 60% from line k-i. The 
sharing principle states that the outflow of 70 MW of line i-m comes from 40% of the line j-i that is 
to say 28MW and from 60% of the line k-i that is say 42 MW. Similarly, the outflow of 30 MW of 
the line i-l comes from 40% on line j-i that is to say 12 MW and from 60% of the line k-i that is to 
say 18 MW. 
Different approaches have been proposed to calculate the average participation tariff. Bialek 
(1997) proposes a matrix approach to calculate the average participation tariff. Kirschen et al. 
(1996) proposes a graph approach where the network and the power flows describe an oriented 
graph. The cost allocation consists then in following the power flows from generators to consumers 
respecting the sharing principles. Other studies have applied the average participation tariff to real 
networks and compared the resulting network tariffs with other cost allocation principles (Olmos, 
2006; Olmos-Pérez Arriaga, 2007). The coordination provided by the average participation tariff has 
never been studied from the point of the view of the investment dynamics (Olmos, 2006; Stoft, 
2006). The following sections aim at evaluating the efficiency of the average participation tariff to 
coordinate generation and transmission investments.  
More generally, the following model evaluates the efficiency of different combinations of 
options to operate the system (redispatch and nodal pricing) and of network tariffs (no tariff
1
 or the 
average participation tariff).  
3 Model of transmission and generation investment in a liberalised power system 
In a liberalised power system where the TSO and the generator are unbundled, they both invest 
to maximize their own objective. However the transmission investments and the location of 
generation remain strongly interdependent. They must coordinate to maximize the social welfare. 
Locational signals implements this coordination.  
The first part of this section presents the problem used to evaluate the efficiency of locational 
signals to coordinate generation and transmission investments. The second part of this section 
 
1
 The option with no tariff assumes that the generator is located exactly at the node where she must be connected. 
Then there is no need of a connection line. 
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models for this simple case the objective function of the TSO and the generator to make investment 
decisions, and the interaction between the locational signals and their investment decisions.  
3.1 Problem data 
To evaluate the efficiency of the locational to coordinate the generation and transmission 
investments, the system of fig. 2 is studied for twenty years.  
 
 
Fig. 2. Modeled system. 
 
Load has the five following characteristics. 1° It is located to the east. 2° Over the year, load is 
described by a linear load duration curve. 3° The first year, load varies between 1700 MW and 3400 
MW. 4° Minimum and maximum loads increase by 2% each year. 5° It is inelastic. The last two 
assumptions about load are usual ones in investment planning. 
Generation has the following characteristics. Base and peak plants (respectively indexed B and 
P) generate power. When the total generation capacity is not enough to supply demand, there is 
Energy Non Supplied (ENS). In the model, a plant located at the same node as load and with the 
same capacity as load stands for the ENS. This plant has a cost (CENS) of 10 000 €/MWh to reflect 
the economic loss of power for demand. The peak investments are decided by arbitrating between 
the opportunity to build a new peak plant and the opportunity to shed load and so to have a quantity 
of Energy Non Supplied (Stoft, 2002). 
The marginal cost of peak generation is 30 €/MWh. The investment cost of this generation type 
is 5.2 million euros2. The marginal cost of base generation to the east (indexed E) CBE is 18 €/MWh 
while to the west (indexed W) CBW is 18 €/MWh + ε, where ε is very small. Such a little difference ε 
between the base generation cost to the east and to the west avoids that there is an indetermination 
on the plant (to the west or to the east) that is first in the merit order. The generator can choose to 
invest in two types of base plants, both of them with a unit generation capacity QB of 200 MW. The 
first type of base plants is located to the west and costs IBW. It is 5% cheaper than to locate a plant to 
the east with an investment cost IBE. The investment cost of a new base plant is 206 million euros to 
the east and 216 million euros to the west. But the plants to the west are far from load. Reinforcing 
the transmission network may then be needed to connect a plant to the west. The unit capacity of the 
 
2
 For these numerical simulations, the data for the generation costs are similar to the data used by Stoft (2002, page 
124). The investment costs are then calculated assuming that the discount rate is equal to 8%. 
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network investment QT is 400 MW and costs IT is 60 million euros. The generator can then have to 
pay for a share of the cost of the network if she connects to the west. The costs are discounted over 
years by a discount rate of 8%.  
As load grows over time, the generator and the TSO could build no more than one investment 
each year for each type of investments. And these investments are lumpy with a capacity of (i.) 
10 MW for a peak plant, (ii.) 200 MW for a base plant to the east, (iii.) 200 MW for a base plant to 
the west, or (iv.) 400 MW for a network investment. The initial transmission capacity is 2550 MW. 
The initial generation capacity of base plants is 2400 MW and the initial capacity of peak plants is 
1000 MW.  
The choice of marginal and investment costs for the base plants avoids that the decision to 
locate a plant modifies the energy mix (between base and peak plants and ENS), since this paper 
only focuses on the effect of short run and long run locational signals on the location of new plants. 
At the same time, the peak plant and the ENS give realism to our model. If there is congestion, the 
peak plants and the ENS substitute to base plants to the west.  
3.2 General presentation of the model 
The model measures the efficiency of different locational signals to coordinate generation and 
transmission investments in the liberalised power system. These investments must coordinate to 
minimize the social cost of the whole system.  
In a vertically integrated utility, the location of generation obviously takes into account the 
constraints and the reinforcement projects of the network. Similarly, when reinforcing the network, 
the transmission investments of the integrated utility take into account not only the congestion cost 
but also the location of new plants. In a liberalised system, when the TSO and the generator are 
unbundled, the generator takes into account the network constraints and the network reinforcements 
to locate plants only through the short-run and long term locational signals if they are implemented. 
And the TSO reinforces the network to minimize the sum of the investment cost and of the 
congestion cost that result from the location of power plants.  
The global problem of coordination between generation and transmission investments is split in 
four steps as shown on fig. 3.  
The first step is the optimization problem of the system operation. The TSO operates the power 
system to minimize the short run generation cost while respecting the network capacity constraints. 
The TSO can send short-run locational signals depending on the implemented option to operate the 
system. Besides, the TSO uses this step to know the congestion cost. The subsection 3.3. presents 
this step of the model.  
The second step deals with the long term optimization problem from the results of the system 
operation in the previous step. The TSO is assumed perfectly regulated and benevolent. She invests 
to minimize the sum of the network investment cost and the congestion cost. The TSO is also 
assumed to anticipate perfectly the generation investments. The subsection 3.4. presents this step. 
In the third step, the TSO calculates the network tariffs. Depending on the implemented option, 
long term locational signals can then be sent. The subsection 3.5. presents this step. 
The fourth and last step is the generation investment decision. The generator is assumed to have 
neither a short-run market power nor a long run one. Therefore, it is similar to consider a unique and 
benevolent generator or several competitive ones. To locate plants, the generator considers the 
locational signals from the system operation and the network tariffs. The generator is also assumed 
to anticipate perfectly the network capacity and the value of potential locational signals. The 
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subsection 3.6. presents the problem of minimization of generation cost.  
 
 
Fig. 3. Box representation of the model.  
 
3.3 Model of system operation 
This paper considers that only two options can be implemented to operate the power system. 
The system can be operated either by nodal pricing or with a one-price market followed by 
redispatch. This short-run step of the model calculates for each plant
3
 k the generated quantity Sk. 
The constraints of the optimization problem are the maximal generation capacity max
kS of each plant 
k, the balance between generation and load D. Depending on the option chosen to operate the 
system, these constraints may also include the maximal capacity Fmax of the unique transmission 
line in our example. Ck is the short run generation cost function of each plant k. The generator is 
assumed to have no market power and bids in a competitive way. Transmission is assumed lossless. 
The generated quantities in a nodal market can be found solving the problem defined by the 
equations 1 to 4 (Bompard et al., 2003) and S* stands for these quantities.  
( )





∑
k
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S
SCmin  (1) 
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{ } max0;;;
kk
SSENSPBEBWk ≤≤∈∀  (2) 
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k
k =∑  (3) 
max
FS
BW
≤  (4) 
 
 
3
 Indexed BW for base investment to the west (far from load), BE for investment of base plant to the east (near load), 
P for investment of peak plant (to the east) and ENS for the Energy Non Supplied. 
  
9 
If redispatch is implemented, the generator minimizes the generation cost under the constraints 
of its maximal capacity but without taking into account the network capacity constraints. Since the 
generator is paid or pays its marginal cost when redispatched, the redispatch does not change the 
profit maximization of the generator. Her profit is only related to the one-price energy market that 
precedes the redispatch step. The profit maximization of the generator when redispatch is 
implemented can be modeled by the equations 5 to 7 as follow. S** stands for the quantities that 
would be generated if congestion was not taken into account.  
 
( )





∑
k
kk
S
SCmin  (5) 
s.t.  
{ } max0;; kk SSPBEBOk ≤≤∈∀  (6) 
DS
k
k =∑  (7) 
Repeating the step of system operation for each hour h and each year y of the studied period, the 
TSO and the generator decide their investments. 
3.4 Model of network investment 
The TSO is assumed benevolent. She invests to minimize the sum of the network investment 
cost and the congestion cost (Stoft, 2006). Without market power from generators, this 
minimization is equivalent to the maximization of the social welfare for given generation 
investments (Pérez Arriaga-Smeers 2003). The TSO calculates the congestion cost for the studied 
period from the generated quantities S*k,y,h that take into account the network capacity constraints, 
and the generated quantities S**k,y,h that do not take into account these constraints. The quantities S* 
and S** are then deduced from the previous step.  
The congestion cost CCy,h for an hour h of a year y is the sum for all the plants k of the 
variations in cost induced by the limited network capacity. The congestion cost can then be defined 
as follows:  
( ) ( )( )∑ −=
k
hykkhykkhy SCSCCC ,,,,, ***  (8) 
For the two-node node network considered in this paper, the TSO increases the capacity of the 
unique transmission line to minimize the cost of investment and the congestion cost. The 
transmission investments are assumed lumpy and they all have the same capacity QT. For each year 
y of the studied period, the decision variables of the network investment δy are binary. If δy equals 
one, the capacity of the line increases by QT MW the year y. If δy equals zero, the capacity of the line 
stays the same for the year y. Each network investment (with a capacity of QT) costs IT. The costs 
are discounted by a rate a. 
The network investment problem for the TSO is the following one:  
 
( ) ( ) ( )( )∑ ∑∑ 





−++ −
y k h
hykkhykkTy
y
SCSCIa
y
,,,, ***1min δδ
 (9) 
Such that the system operation determines the generated quantities S*k,y,h that take into 
account congestion, and S**k,y,h that do not take into account congestion  
 
The solution of this optimization problem gives the moment when the network investments 
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must be done given the congestion cost. The capacity of the line is calculated for each year y 
knowing the decision variables of network investment δy. Assuming the initial transmission capacity 
of the line is Fini, the capacity Fmax,yc of the line for the year yc can be calculated as follows:  
∑
=
+=
c
c
y
y
yTiniy QFF
1
max, δ  (10) 
The constraints in the system operation then depend on network investment decisions.  
Because of vertical unbundling, the TSO can no more directly act on the location of generation. 
But she can influence it reinforcing the network and sending locational signals, especially long term 
ones.  
3.5 Calculus of the average participation tariff 
This paper considers only two options for the network tariff. When the first option is 
implemented, the generator does not pay any network tariff. When the second option is 
implemented, the generator pays an average participation tariff.  
In the considered example, the average participation tariff can be easily calculated. The flow 
tracing is obvious because there is only one line. Only the power plants to the west use the 
transmission network to supply load to the east. Only these plants to the west pay a network tariff. 
The level of the tariff is calculated in three steps. The average participation tariff is calculated from 
the Maximum Allowed Revenue (MAR) and the MAR is calculated using the equations 11 to 13 
(Joskow, 2006).  
First, the Regulated Asset Base (RAB) is calculated from one year to another taking into 
account the investments of the last year and the depreciation of the existing lines that are not still 
completely depreciated.  
 
RAB(n) = RAB(n - 1) – Annuities(n - 1) + Investments(n - 1) (11) 
 
The depreciation annuity is a simple division of the investment cost by the depreciation period 
decided by the regulator.  
 
Annuity = Investment cost / Depreciation period (12) 
 
For the considered two-node network, the depreciation annuity is calculated assuming that the 
new network investments are depreciated over forty years and the initial transmission capacity is 
depreciated over thirty years from the beginning of the study.  
The MAR is calculated from the depreciation annuities, from the RAB and from the return on 
investment
4
. In the present case, the return on investment WACC
5
 is assumed to be equal to 7,5%.  
 
MAR(n) = RAB(n) x WACC + Annuities(n) (13) 
 
The average participation tariff is calculated from the MAR. Moreover, to allocate optimally the 
cost of transmission lines, only the cost of the used share of lines should be allocated to the users 
responsive to the locational signals. To the contrary, the cost of the unused share of lines should be 
allocated to the users the less sensitive to locational signals since the unused share of the line is 
 
4
 The regulator usually decides the return on investment. 
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linked to the lumpiness of the transmission capacity (Pérez Arriaga-Smeers, 2003). These users of 
the network are a priori those that are already little responsive to price signals, that is to say 
consumers. As a result, the power plants that use the network are assumed to pay only 50% of the 
cost of the used share of the transmission capacity.  
The calculation of the tariff has just been presented. Previous subsections modeled the objective 
function of the TSO and the main options of system operation. The following subsection presents 
the objective function of the generator.  
 
3.6 Model of generation investment 
The generator is assumed to have no market power. The objective of profit maximization is then 
similar to cost minimization. The generator invests in order to minimize the sum of short run 
generation cost and generation investment costs and of the network tariff.  
As seen in 3.3, the generation operation cost can take into account congestion or not depending 
on the chosen option to operate the system. As seen in 3.5, the generator can also have to pay an 
average participation tariff, depending on the chosen option for network tariff and on its location.  
To invest, the generator arbitrates between these two costs and the generation investment cost. 
The generation investments are assumed lumpy. The unit capacity of the base (respectively peak) 
investments is QB (resp. QP). For each year y of the studied period, the decision variables of the 
generation investment δk,y are binary. If δk,y equals one, the generation capacity of the plant k 
increases by Q MW
6
 the year y. If δk,y equals zero, the generation capacity of the plant k stays 
unchanged the year y. The investment cost of the plant k equals Ik. The discount rate is a. Then the 
generation investment problem is as follows: 
( ) ( )∑ ∑ ∑ 










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+++ −
y k h
hykkykkyk
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SCTarifIa
yk
,,,,1min
,
δ
δ
 (14) 
Such that the system operation determines the generated quantities Sk,y,h 
 
The solution of this problem gives the moment when and the location where the generator must 
invest. The capacity of a generation plant k can be calculated for each year y from the decision 
variables of this investment δk,y. Assuming the initial generation capacity of the plant k is Sini,k, the 
capacity Sk,max,yc of this plant for the year yc can be calculated as follows:  
∑
=
+=
c
c
y
y
ykkiniyk QSS
1
,,,max, δ  (15) 
The constraints for the system operation then depend on generation investment decisions.  
The fundamental elements of the coordination problem are now defined. The following 
subsection models how they interact.  
3.7 Interaction between locational signals and transmission and generation investments 
Sauma-Oren (2006a, b) assume the investment decisions for generation and transmission are 
sequential with a priority given to the generation investments. With their assumption, the TSO must 
reinforce the network taking into account the investment decisions of generation.  
However, it is interesting to consider situations where the TSO cannot invest. It is a current 
                                                                                                                                                                                                 
5
 Weighted Average Cost of Capital 
6
 Q being QB or QP depending on the plant k being a base or peak one.  
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situation because of the oppositions to building of new power transmission lines. In such situation, 
the generators must adapt the location of their new plant to supply load despite the network 
constraints.  
As a result, we made no assumption about generation or transmission investing sequentially 
first. Different equilibriums can then be observed for the problem of generation and transmission 
investments in the liberalised power system. This assumption of non-sequential investments allows 
to highlight non-linear effects of network tariffs and of transmission capacity lumpiness7.  
The problem of coordinating generation and transmission investments is then a double 
minimization, respectively of the objective function of the TSO and of the generator, as follows:  
 
( ) ( ) ( )( )
( ) ( )













+++






−++
∑ ∑ ∑
∑ ∑∑
−
−
yt k h
hykkykkyk
y
y k h
hykkhykkTy
y
SCTarifIa
SCSCIa
yk
y
,,,,
,,,,
1min
***1min
,
δ
δ
δ
δ  (16) 
Such that the system operation determines the generated quantities Sk,y,h 
 
This optimization problem has three important features. First the investment variables are 
binary. Second the calculation of the tariff is an average one. These two first features create non-
convexity. Lastly, this problem is a double optimization. These features prevent us from solving this 
problem with analytical tools. That’s why the equilibrium conditions of this problem are studied 
with numerical simlations. A genetic algorithm fits particularly well to solve investment problems 
in the power system (Latorre et al., 2003) and to solve a double optimization problem such as (18) 
by search of dominant point (Srinivas-Deb, 1995).  
To define a set of dominant points, the following double optimization problem is deemed,  
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where F and G respectively stand for the objective function of the TSO and of the generator in 
the present case. 
It is said that a point ( )*,* , yky δδ  dominates another point ( )§,§ , yky δδ  if  
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The dominant points dominate all the other possible points in the meaning of (18). The set of 
dominant points is called the Pareto Front and they are the different equilibriums solutions to the 
problem of double optimization (17). Since the two criteria we want to optimize are contradictory, 
there exist several equilibriums. The example on fig. 4 illustrates such a situation, where the x-axis 
and the y-axis respectively stand for the value of the function F and G for the points ( )yky ,,δδ . The 
Pareto front is the set of points that are the nearest to the bottom left corner of fig. 4, that is to say 
the clear squares. 
 
 
7
 The lumpiness of the generation investments induces nonlinearity too but to a lesser extent given the parameters of 
the numerical example (see 2.1.). 
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Fig. 4. Pareto front of a double minimization. 
 
The following section evaluates with this algorithm the efficiency of short run and long run 
locational signals to coordinate the generation and transmission investments on the example of a 
two-node network. 
4 Results and analyses 
This section presents the results and analyses of the simulations. First the generation and 
transmission investments of a benevolent integrated utility, her achieved coordination and social 
cost define a benchmark. Second this benchmark is compared to the social cost and the coordination 
achieved in a liberalised system where locational signals coordinate generation and transmission 
investments.  
4.1 Benchmark of a benevolent integrated utility 
The efficiency of locational signals is measured and compared to the optimal investment 
strategy of a benevolent integrated utility as a benchmark. Such a utility minimizes the total cost of 
the power system, that is to say the sum of the network investment cost, the generation investment 
cost and the short-run generation cost under the constraints of the network capacity.  
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Such that the system operation determines the generated quantities S*k,y,h  
 
With the data presented in section 2., the social cost of the optimal solution of this problem is 
6.05 billion euros
8
. The most efficient location of generation is to the east near load. 
 
8
 We obtain this result with a genetic algorithm too.  
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4.2 System equilibrium without locational signals 
To analyze the efficiency of locational signals to coordinate generation and transmission 
investments, the worst case is studied first, when neither short run locational signals nor long run 
ones are implemented. Congestion is managed with redispatch and the generator pays no network 
tariff.  
Each equilibrium is characterized by the value that the objective functions of the TSO and the 
generator take. Each equilibrium is then positioned in the plan defined by these two objective 
functions (fig. 5). 
 
 
Fig. 5. Equilibriums of the investment problem in a liberalised system without locational signal. 
 
There are multiple equilibriums for this double minimization because the cost of the network 
can decrease if the generation cost ingeniously increases
9
. This happens because the generator is not 
informed of the transmission cost her locational decision induces. The equilibrium circled at the 
bottom of fig. 5 is the same investment strategy as the optimal one. This equilibrium has the 
smallest cost of the network. The social cost of the other equilibriums is greater than the social cost 
of the optimum. In a liberalised system, the generator wants to minimize her costs. This equilibrium 
is the point the more to the left on fig. 5. 
The locational signals coordinate efficiently generation and transmission when they penalise 
sufficiently the generator if she does not locate in accordance with the social cost minimization. For 
the generator to take optimal investment decisions, the suboptimal generation investments must be 
more expensive to her than the optimal ones. The locational signals must lead the suboptimal points 
to the right of the system optimum, in the hatched part of fig. 5. The effect of nodal pricing to 
coordinate the generation and transmission investments is now studied.  
 
9
 If the generator builds her base plants near load, her investment costs are greater but there is no need to reinforce the 
network.  
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4.3 Efficiency of nodal pricing to coordinate generation and transmission 
In this sub-section, the generator pays nodal pricing but no network tariff. As previously, the 
equilibriums of this problem are positioned in a plan defined by the objective function of the 
generator for the x-axis and by the objective function of the TSO for the y-axis. To evaluate the 
effect of nodal pricing, these equilibriums are compared with those without locational signal in fig. 
6.  
 
 
Fig. 6. Equilibriums of the investment problem in a liberalised system without tariff.  
Comparison of the equilibriums with and without nodal pricing. 
 
The equilibriums reached with redispatch are the clear squares whereas those reached with 
nodal pricing are the dark crosses. Fig. 6 shows that only one of the suboptimal equilibriums with 
redispatch loses its quality of equilibrium when it is evaluated with nodal pricing. It is the only cross 
that is not inscribed in a circle.  
The arrows between the equilibriums with redispatch and with nodal pricing stand for the 
effects of nodal pricing on the cost for the generator. Fig. 6 shows also that nodal pricing penalises 
the generator for all the equilibriums except for the optimal one (where there is no congestion givent 
the transmission investment in this case). The penalties are too small because all the equilibriums 
with redispatch except one are still equilibriums with nodal pricing.  
Fig. 6 shows also that nodal pricing does not eliminate preferentially the equilibrium with the 
highest cost of the network. Nodal pricing penalises weakly this equilibrium. Lumpiness of the 
transmission capacity creates this effect. For this investment strategy, the generator builds all her 
base plants to the west far from the load. The TSO is forced to increase the transmission capacity. 
And the lumpiness of these network investments decreases the difference in nodal pricing so that 
the generator faces no price difference. The generator is then only partially informed of the 
consequences of her behavior, which induce network investment costs. For this example, we can 
conclude that nodal pricing poorly coordinates the location of generation and lumpy transmission 
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investments. The two following subsections analyze now if long term locational signals increase 
coordination between generation and transmission investments.  
4.4 Efficiency of the average participation tariff to coordinate generation and transmission 
In this subsection, the generator must pay for the network she uses through the average 
participation tariff, whether there is congestion on the network or not. To analyze the effect of the 
average participation tariff, the system is first assumed to be operated with redispatch.  
To evaluate the coordination reached with the average participation tariff, the related 
equilibriums are positioned in the same plan as before (objective function of the generator for the x-
axis and objective function of the TSO for the y-axis – fig. 7). These equilibriums can then be 
compared with those without average participation tariff.  
 
 
Fig. 7. Equilibriums of the investment problem in a liberalised power system.  
Comparison of the equilibriums without tariff, with tariff, and with tariff and nodal pricing. 
 
The equilibriums reached with redispatch and without average participation tariff are the clear 
squares whereas those reached with redispatch and average participation tariff are the dark triangles. 
Fig. 7 shows that every investment strategy without the average participation tariff remains 
equilibrium with average participation tariff. The average participation tariff then fails in 
incentivising an efficient location of the generator, although with average participation tariff the 
inefficient equilibriums are now very close to the point where the generator finds it less profitable to 
choose these investment strategies.  
The system is now assumed to be operated with nodal pricing and the generator must pay the 
average participation tariff for the power plant far from load to the west. To evaluate the 
coordination reached when nodal pricing and the average participation tariff are jointly 
implemented, the related equilibriums are positioned in the same plan as before and compared with 
the equilibriums calculated previously. The equilibriums reached with nodal pricing and without 
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average participation tariff are ‘x’ crosses whereas those reached with nodal pricing and average 
participation tariff are ‘+’ crosses. 
Previously, we have shown that the implementation of one locational signal is not sufficient. 
Whereas now, fig. 7 shows that the joint implementation of nodal pricing and the average 
participation tariff constraints the generator to choose the generation investment strategy that 
minimizes the social cost. Therefore, the implementation of the short run and long run locational 
signals optimally coordinates the transmission and generation investments in this case.  
4.5 A case of inefficient location of generation caused by the average participation tariff 
The average participation tariff can also lead to inefficient location of generation in some 
particular situations. Consider a case where the initial transmission capacity is not 2550 MW 
anymore but 2700MW without modifying the other data of the problem. The optimal social cost (if 
a benevolent integrated utility were investing) is then 6.04 billion euros
10
. The optimal set of 
generation and transmission investments is then the following one. The efficient location of 
generation is to the east, near load, except for the first investment of a base plant and no 
transmission is needed. Fig. 8. shows why this is the optimal set of generation investments.  
 
  
• a. 1
st
 generation investment to the west • b. 2
nd
 generation investment to the west? 
 
• d. N
th
 generation investment to the east • c. 2
nd
 generation investment to the east? 
  
Fig. 8. Optimal sequence of generation investments when the initial transmission capacity is 2700 MW 
 
10
 This optimization was also realized with a genetic algorithm.  
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The initial transmission capacity is 2700 MW while the initial generation capacity to the west 
far from load is 2400 MW. As a consequence, there are 300 MW of available transmission capacity. 
It is a sufficient capacity to transmit generation of only one new base plant with a unit capacity of 
200 MW (fig. 8.a. and b.). For the following generation investments, the investment cost is greater 
to the east than to the west. But the location of generation to the west would require to reinforce the 
network to ensure that generation can supply load. As a result, it is cheaper to locate generation near 
load (Fig. 8.c. and d.). 
Consider now the same system when transmission and generation are unbundled. To evaluate 
the coordination reached with the average participation tariff in this case, the equilibriums of the 
investment problem are positioned in the same plan as before (objective function of the generator 
for the x-axis and objective function of the TSO for the y-axis – fig. 9). These equilibriums can then 
be compared with those without average participation tariff
11
. 
 
 
Fig. 9. Impact of the average participation tariff on the coordination  
between generation and transmission investments 
 
The clear squares stand for the equilibriums with redispatch and without tariff. When the 
average participation tariff is implemented, the equilibriums become the dark triangles. And the 
circled triangles are the points that form part of the Pareto front in this case. The arrows between the 
equilibriums without tariff and those with the average participation tariff illustrate the effect of the 
network tariff on the cost for the generator.  
When the generator pays the network tariff, there are only two equilibriums left, represented by 
 
11
 Only the equilibriums with redispatch are considered because there is no congestion on the transmission network, 
except a little one on one equilibrium only.  
  
19 
the circled triangles on fig. 9. The three other equilibriums without tariff are no more equilibrium 
with the average participation tariff. Either the tariff makes these generation investment plans more 
expensive than those corresponding to the global optimum or the equilibriums with tariff now 
dominate the equilibriums corresponding to these generation investment plans. Fig. 9 shows that the 
average participation tariff generally incentivises the generator to invest near load, but not 
sufficiently in some situations. This simulation shows also that it is not sufficient to focus only on 
the equilibrium that minimizes the objective function of generator. Of course, this equilibrium 
without tariff is not an equilibrium anymore with tariff. But the tariff does not ensure that the 
generator chooses the generation investments that lead to the global optimum of the system.  
Besides, the equilibrium of lowest cost (dashed circled on fig. 9) does not correspond to the 
optimum reached by the benevolent integrated utility, because the network tariff penalises 
unfortunately the generator for the optimal generation investment. All the optimal base plant 
investments locate to the same node as load, except the first one because at the beginning of the 
studied period 300 MW of transmission capacity are available (fig. 8). But, the equilibrium of 
lowest cost when generation and transmission are unbundled does not correspond to the optimal 
investment plans, because the generator does not realize this first investment far from load. This 
investment far from load would be more expensive to her than to locate all her base plants to the 
same node as load. Locating one plant far from load would indeed force her to pay the network 
tariff. Of course, the network tariff improves the coordination between generation and transmission 
investments. But, there is no guarantee that it allows to reach the optimum of the system.  
5 Conclusion 
To show the interactions between the locational signals and the generation and transmission 
investments, this paper modeled a system where a TSO and a generator are unbundled and 
maximize their objective functions. The TSO upgrades the network to minimize the sum of the 
congestion cost and the investment cost, since she is perfectly regulated. The generator minimizes 
the sum of the investment cost, the short run generation cost taking into account network capacity 
constraints or not and the network tariffs she may have to pay.  
Numerical simulations showed that the locational signals coordinate the generation and 
transmission investments with a variable efficiency because of lumpiness of transmission 
investment. The nodal pricing is seldom sufficient to coordinate the generation and transmission 
investments because lumpiness of transmission investment greatly decreases the differences in 
nodal prices that should signal congestion. The implementation of the average participation tariff 
does not ensure that the generation and transmission investments is eventually optimal, because it is 
hard to take into account the lumpiness of transmission investment while respecting cost 
reflectivity. The average participation tariff then includes lumpiness only imperfectly. But 
implementing this tariff signicatively improves the coordination between generation and 
transmission investments. The joint implementation of nodal pricing and the average participation 
tariff stays the best combination to coordinate as efficiently as possible the generation and 
transmission investments. The simulations show also that implementing locational network tariffs is 
prioritary over implementing nodal pricing to coordinate more efficiently the location of generation 
with lumpy transmission investment. In the considered examples, the average participation tariff 
allows a more efficient location of generation even when the congestion management scheme is 
redispatch.  
Future researchs will have to confirm the results of this work. First one could extend the study 
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of average participation tariff on larger and meshed network. One could then precise the effect of 
parallel flows in the coordination process between the location of generation and lumpy 
transmission investments. Besides, one could reproduce the work of this paper to study the 
interaction between investments and the marginal participation tariff, which is the network tariff 
applied in Great Britain (Green, 1997b). One could also compare the efficiency of average and 
marginal participation tariffs to extend the existing comparisons of these network tariffs (Olmos, 
2006; Olmos-Pérez Arriaga, 2007). Moreover, to make the behavior of generators more realistic, 
one could consider market power and model the difficulty that they may feel to evaluate the 
evolution of nodal prices after investment of lumpy transmission capacity. One should also consider 
other investment situtations where the location of generation modifies not only the investment cost 
but also the marginal generation cost. Lastly, to exemplify the effect of network regulation, one 
should modify the objective function of the TSO to cost-of-service regulation or to implementable 
incentive regulation schemes (Stoft, 2006). One could then evaluate the impact of regulation on the 
coordination between generation and transmission investments.  
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